The Government Accountability Office says the National Nuclear Security Administration never told Congress what its uranium enrichment programs will cost over the long run. The estimate is $140 billion through 2105, and the law requires it to appear in the agency’s biennial Enriched Uranium Management Plan. It has never been formally reported there.
GAO released the findings on August 20, 2026, in a report titled “Nuclear Fuel: Actions Needed to Enhance Cost Reporting and Economic Analysis for Federal Uranium Supply Efforts.” The $140 billion covers three long-term enrichment efforts that NNSA is pursuing.
Money is already going out. The Department of Energy has committed $900 million to expand low-enriched uranium (LEU) capacity and $1.8 billion to build high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) capacity.
A supply gap
The United States does not have a fully domestic enrichment capability today. A ban on LEU imports from Russia adds uncertainty to future supply.
That matters because current law and policy keep the government from using imported uranium, or uranium enriched with foreign technology, for national security work. NNSA supplies enriched uranium for tritium production for nuclear weapons and for naval reactor fuel. GAO found the agency holds enough LEU and highly enriched uranium to cover those needs until the 2040s.
DOE, meanwhile, backs enrichment for commercial power plants, medical isotope production and research reactors. Estimates of LEU supply and demand are generally well established, GAO said, though the Russian ban clouds the picture. HALEU demand estimates vary, and projected supply may fall short of near-term demand.
Five recommendations, none acted on
GAO made five recommendations. The NNSA Administrator should make sure future management plans include current long-term cost estimates for the Defense Fuels program, and should update that program’s management documentation to meet Program Execution Instruction requirements.
The Secretary of Energy got three. Economic analyses behind DOE’s uranium work should follow best practices and executive branch guidance. The required report to Congress on HALEU availability should be finished. And the documents guiding DOE’s LEU and HALEU support should match agency guidance and best practices.
All five remain open. Actions to carry them out have not been taken or are still being planned.
GAO’s assessment of the current arrangement is blunt: without transparent cost reporting and rigorous economic analysis, Congress and the public have no clear accounting of what it costs to maintain the nuclear arsenal and civilian nuclear infrastructure, and the government is running a patchwork of enrichment spending with no clear strategic justification or documented return on investment.
