MOSCOW, July 13 — The arithmetic of Russia’s war economy is becoming harder to balance. Oil and gas still account for approximately 30 percent of federal budget revenue, and Moscow booked $180 billion from crude exports in 2023. The catch is that those revenues are under direct pressure from a campaign of Ukrainian strikes on Russian refinery infrastructure, and the damage is compounding in ways that ripple from the battlefield to the domestic fuel market.
The mechanics here are straightforward. When Ukrainian drones and missiles hit refineries and storage depots, they reduce Russia’s capacity to process crude into gasoline and diesel.
That cuts both domestic supply and the volume available for export. In 2024, the effect was immediate: Russian gasoline prices rose by 15 percent. The Kremlin’s response was a temporary ban on gasoline exports, imposed from March through August last year, intended to keep enough fuel inside the country to prevent panic and political discontent.
But the military’s demand does not pause. Russian forces in Ukraine consume an estimated 10,000 tons of fuel per day.
That is a fixed, non-negotiable line item in the war budget. Every refinery outage that shrinks domestic supply forces a choice: divert fuel from civilians to the front, or find it elsewhere. Belarus steps in as a stopgap Moscow has turned to Minsk.
Belarusian exports of refined products to Russia rose by 20 percent in 2024. On closer reading, that figure signals a structural shift: a country that was once a transit corridor for Russian oil is now a net supplier of processed fuel to its larger neighbor. The relationship has flipped, at least temporarily, and the dependence cuts against the grain of Moscow’s long-standing narrative of energy self-sufficiency.
The March 1, 2025 strike on Stavropol Krai adds another layer of risk. That region sits in Russia’s southern oil-producing heartland, and the attack could further strain fuel supplies for the military.
Follow the logic: less refining capacity means less fuel for tanks, trucks, and aircraft. The Stavropol strike is not an isolated incident; it is part of a pattern of sustained pressure on the logistical backbone of the Russian campaign in Ukraine. What to watch next The key variable is whether Ukraine can sustain the tempo of these strikes.
Each hit on a refinery or depot forces Russia to either repair faster, import more from Belarus, or divert crude exports away from global markets to feed domestic refineries. All three options carry costs.
Repairing damaged infrastructure is expensive and slow. Buying more from Belarus strengthens Minsk’s bargaining position. Diverting crude from export reduces the very dollar revenue that funds the war.
The export ban in 2024 was a temporary fix. If refinery damage continues through 2025 and into 2026, Moscow may have to consider longer-term restrictions or accept higher domestic prices. Either path carries political risk at home and financial risk on global markets.
The arithmetic is not getting easier.
