WASHINGTON, July 9 — The return of what is being called a maximum pressure campaign against Iran is unfolding along several tracks, with analysts and policymakers watching for escalation points that could reshape oil markets and regional security. President Donald Trump’s declaration on February 4, 2025, set in motion a series of potential actions that the United States and its allies may take, and that Iran may counter. The policy echoes the first maximum pressure campaign, implemented in 2018 during the Trump administration’s first term.
That effort reduced Iranian oil exports from 2.5 million barrels per day to under 500,000 by 2020, according to figures that remain a benchmark for current assessments. The 2024 ceasefire had lifted some sanctions on Iranian oil exports, but that relief now appears fragile.
One immediate scenario involves the U.S. reimposing sanctions on Iranian oil exports. The Treasury Department could designate additional entities involved in the Iranian oil trade, expanding the web of financial restrictions that made the earlier campaign effective. The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, may increase patrols in the Strait of Hormuz.
Such patrols could lead to confrontations with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps speedboats. At the United Nations, the Security Council could hold an emergency session to discuss the situation.
However, Russia and China, both permanent members with veto power, may block any new resolutions against Iran. This diplomatic reality limits the multilateral options available to Washington. The International Energy Agency could coordinate a release of strategic petroleum reserves among its member states.
Such a coordinated release was done in 2022. The U.S. Energy Department could also authorize a drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, though that requires a presidential order. Goldman Sachs analysts, in a note dated February 4, projected that Brent crude could reach $85 per barrel if tensions escalate further.
Iran’s possible responses
Iran may retaliate by resuming high-level uranium enrichment at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors reported on February 3 that enrichment activities at Fordow were at a level that could be escalated quickly. The next OPEC+ meeting is scheduled for March 5, 2025, where member states may adjust production quotas in response to the evolving situation.
The U.S. Congress could debate new legislation on Iran sanctions. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has scheduled a hearing on February 10, which will likely examine the administration’s strategy and consider additional statutory authority to target Iranian oil revenues.
The maximum pressure campaign is not a single action but a coordinated set of economic, diplomatic, and military tools. The Treasury Department’s designations, the Fifth Fleet’s patrols, the IEA’s reserve releases, and the congressional hearings all fit into a broader strategy aimed at limiting Iran’s ability to fund its regional activities and nuclear program. The earlier campaign demonstrated that sanctions can sharply reduce Iranian oil exports, but it also showed that enforcement requires constant attention and that Iran can adapt through smuggling and alternative payment systems.
The situation remains fluid, and the scenarios outlined by analysts are possibilities, not certainties. The February 4 declaration has opened a period of uncertainty, and the next few weeks will show whether Iran chooses to escalate or negotiate.
What is clear is that the maximum pressure campaign, with its history of reducing oil exports to a fraction of their previous level, is once again on the table. The coming months will test whether the same tools produce the same results, and at what cost to global stability.
